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QUAKER STUDIES 512 (2001) [121-139] 
QUAKER PLAINING AS CRITICAL AESTHETIC* 
Peter Collins 
University of Durham, England 
ABSTRACT 
In the first part of this paper I explore the possibility of identifYing a Quaker 
aesthetic through the concepts 'plain' and 'plaining'. I begin with an examination of 
the importance of 'the plain' as product and practice to seventeenth-century Friends 
and briefly outline its enduring importance to Quakers. Friends, however, were not 
the first group to adopt the plain style which is better understood when located in its 
broader historical context. For Quakers, the plain is ethic as well as aesthetic, par­
tially grounding all Quaker testimonies. Given the well-documented aestheticization 
of contemporary life, I argue that the Quaker plain and plaining have a continuing 
relevance, representing a moral, aesthetic and religious critique of consumer culture, 
distinct from those which are economically and politically motivated. 
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Quaker Plain as Product and Process 
The Quaker plain style has been an important means of establishing and 
maintaining the group's sense of identity and belonging. At one time this 
was achieved primarily by 'playing the vis-a-vis' with Anglicanism: the 
* I would like to thank the participants at the 1998 Quaker Studies Research 
Association Conference, held at Woodbrooke College, for their patience in hearing 
me out. I am also grateful to the editor and both anonymous reviewers who offered 
sensible advice on how I might improve this paper. I remain entirely responsible for 
the final cut of course. 
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first Friends defined themselves in opposition to the Established Church. 
Despite this historical legacy it is probably true to say that today the 
movement generates its identity primarily from within. Even after the 
briefest examination of seventeenth-century Quakerism it soon becomes 
apparent that Friends dwell at length on the plain or simple (Braithwaite 
1912; 1921; Ingle 1994; Lloyd 1950; Vann 1969). Meeting houses, 
dress, language, modes of greeting, form of worship, funerals, grave­
stones: all are made 'plain'. Pacifism itself was justified in relation to the 
plain life by Anthony Benezet G ones 1921: 160). Throughout the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries, numerous and often highly detailed 
prescriptions and proscriptions, at once generating and codifYing what 
constituted the plain, were sent down to local meetings. Many examples 
can be found in the Epistles From the Yearly Meeting (Yearly Meeting of 
Friends: 1818). 
Brayshaw (1982: 188) reminds us that even when the fashionable was 
useful Friends often proscribed its adoption and he cites the rather comi­
cal case of umbrellas. Among eighteenth-century Friends appropriately 
cut coats and hats were plain, umbrellas an unnecessary embellishment 
or ornamentation and a testimony was established against their use. The 
minutes of preparative and monthly meetings indicate that Friends who 
chose to ignore these advices (relating to the broad testimony of plain­
ness) were likely to feel increasing pressure to conform, to act in and see 
the world in a certain way (Braithwaite 1912: 144; 1921: 198; Morgan 
1993: Ch. 7). However, early Friends were not disowned until it was 
clear to their monthly meeting that they had little or no intention of 
upholding one or more of the testimonies (Braithwaite 1921: 25). 
It might be said that Quakers no longer maintain the plain style to the 
extent that they once did. 'Plain language', for instance the use of 'thee' 
and 'thou', is no longer in common usage in Britain, and Quakers have 
long since cast aside the 'plain grey' uniform that became their typical 
mode of dress in the eighteenth century. However, texts such as the 
following persuade me that the plain remains central to Quaker faith and 
practice: 
The heart of Quaker ethics is summed up in the word 'simplicity'. Sim­
plicity is forgetfulness of self and remembrance of our humble status as 
waiting servants of God. Outwardly, simplicity is shunning superfluities of 
dress, speech, behaviour, and possessions, which tend to obscure our 
vision of reality. Inwardly, simplicity is spiritual detachment from the 
things of this world as part of the effort to fulfil the first commandment: 
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to love God with all of the heart and mind and strength (Quaker Faith and 
Practice 1995: 20.27, extracted from Faith and Practice, North Carolina 
Yearly Meeting [Conservative]). 
The passage is complex, pointing up the theological, political and ethical 
as well as the aesthetic potential of the plain. It is interesting that this 
piece was written as recently as 1983. More relevant still is the fact that 
it is included in the 1995 edition of Quaker Faith and Practice: The Book if 
Discipline of the Yearly Meeting if the Religious Society if Friends (Quakers) in 
Britain-a text made available to all Friends in Britain. Quakers continue 
to wrap themselves plainly (Hendry 1993). That is not to say that every 
member and attender of the Society in Britain today lives out the testi­
monies to plainness in the same way that the first generation of Friends 
did. Indeed, there has always been a considerable variation in Friends' 
understanding of the plain (Isichei 1970: 152-53). Clearly 'the simple 
life' is a relative term. Did wealthy Quaker capitalists consider their rela­
tively luxurious lifestyle simple? (See Walvin 1997; Boyson 1970.) 
Nevertheless, it is the case that the plain remains a focus of Quaker faith 
and practice, in the Book of Discipline and, crucially, in the form of 
Quaker worship. These two facets of contemporary Quakerism are criti­
cally important insofar as they contribute to a 'behavioural creed' which 
is the one thing that binds Friends together (Dandelion 1996: 100-1 03). 
Whenever and wherever Quakers meet the discourse of plaining 
remains prominent, though not always consciously. For instance, the 
topic frequently becomes a thread of Quaker email lists. Recently, a 
Friend posted this message: 
When I was at the Mount (a Quaker girls' school) there was a story of a 
Victorian pupil who was told off for having a gaudy ribbon round her 
bonnet. She replied 'We were told that our bonnets must be trimmed 
with Christian simplicity. I went round all the haberdashers asking for 
three yards of Christian simplicity but none of them could sell me any'. 
Further examples might be cited from editions of the British Quaker 
weekly publication The Friend (see, for example, letters regarding 'simple 
food', 7 January and 4 February 2000). In what follows, I want to avoid 
essentializing the plain. My argument does not collapse, or the discourse 
evaporate, at the point when a Friend appears in a colourful jumper or 
orders a cocktail or some other 'fancy' drink at the bar. If an important 
product of the Quaker testimonies is the plain, then we may call the 
process plaining. Plaining is primarily a way of seeing, a socially learned 
cognitive achievement: anything can be plained (Collins 1996). During 
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the last 350 years, Quakers have established a material culture, an ideo­
logical system, codified in texts such as Quaker Faith and Practice, and a 
liturgy which Quakers and others represent as epitomizing the plain. But 
what kind of practice is plaining? 
Aesthetics, Ethics and the Plain 
Plaining is an aesthetic practice, if we accept that the aesthetic cannot be 
restricted to the 'work of art'. During the early part of the twentieth 
century artists such as Marcel Duchamp brought into eclipse the distinc­
tion between art and life. Lyas (1997) argues that we can apply aesthetic 
principles to all that is made. He divides the world into that which is 
made and that which is not (i.e. nature), to which aesthetic judgments 
cannot be made because nature is not given to express anything. Lyas 
argues that all made things are more or less expressive, can legitimately 
be called 'art' and are therefore susceptible to aesthetic judgments. We 
should also note that while the aesthetic illuminates more of the world 
than merely the art object, the art object may invoke a broader perspec­
tive than is defined by the aesthetic-one need think only of Picasso's 
Guernica to understand the extent to which art can also be moral and 
political, for instance (for further discussion of this issue see Welsch 1997: 
92-98). 
If we accept the argument, implicit in Kant and common currency in 
contemporary sociology, that the world is entirely a social construction, 
then everything that we can experience is made and therefore contin­
gent. While this may be easy to understand in relation to social life, it 
may seem confusing to imagine how we might 'make' nature. Consider, 
then, the way in which the Lake District, having been a wild, dangerous 
and largely unregarded place before 1700, suddenly becomes a pic­
turesque idyll, beloved of millions of sojourners thereafter! The Lakes 
were reconstructed through the vision of Gilpin, Wordsworth and other 
eighteenth-century Romantics. I agree with Lyas that it might be anal­
ytically advantageous to include everything we experience as amenable 
to aesthetic judgment. This conclusion chimes with my earlier claim that 
anything can be plained and suggests, furthermore, that plaining is 
indeed an aesthetic enterprise. 
The term 'aesthetics' does not mean one thing but contains a plurality 
of meanings. Welsch identifies a number of criteria of aesthetic experi­
ence, including the sensuous (pleasure), perception (form and proportion), 
124 
QUAKER STUDIES 
Jlished a material culture, an ideo­
as Quaker Faith and Practice, and a 
resent as epitomizing the plain. But 
• and the Plain 
accept that the aesthetic cannot be 
1g the early part of the twentieth 
tp brought into eclipse the distinc­
argues that we can apply aesthetic 
ides the world into that which is 
re), to which aesthetic judgments 
•t given to express anything. Lyas 
or less expressive, can legitimately 
ptible to aesthetic judgments. We 
�tic illuminates more of the world 
�ct may invoke a broader perspec­
-one need think only of Picasso's 
which art can also be moral and 
;sion of this issue see Welsch 1997: 
in Kant and common currency in 
ld is entirely a social construction, 
1ce is made and therefore contin­
:rstand in relation to social life, it 
ve might 'make' nature. Consider, 
ict, having been a wild, dangerous 
1700, suddenly becomes a pic­
sojourners thereafter! The Lakes 
of Gilpin, Wordsworth and other 
� with Lyas that it might be anal­
thing we experience as amenable 
chimes with my earlier claim that 
ts, furthermore, that plaining is 
one thing but contains a plurality 
Jer of criteria of aesthetic experi­
perception (form and proportion), 
COLLINS QUAKER PLAINING AS CRITICAL AESTHETIC 
the subjective (personal preference), harmony, beauty, design, conformity 
to aesthetic theory, sensitivity, the aestheticistic (a heightened aesthetic 
in which one's life is totally absorbed by the aesthetic) and virtuality 
(Welsch 1997: 9-15; see also Adorno 1973; Davies 1991; Hanfling 1992; 
Lyas 1997: Ch. 4; Rader 1973; and Weitz 1959). Given that plaining is 
grounded in the testimonies, we should certainly add 'the ethical' to 
Welsch's list. Aesthetics is not easily disentangled from ethical con­
siderations (Bontekoe and Crooks 1992), a theme that runs through 
plain discourse from the outset. We might say, following Kant, that to 
focus attention on the aesthetically worthwhile leads to reflection on the 
morally good because attention to the aesthetic is disinterested (in the 
sense of an absence of self-interest), as we expect moral action to be (c£ 
Lyas 1997: Ch. 1; Collinson 1992: 134-44; Maquet 1986: 25-34). 
Furthermore, the aesthetic celebrates freedom, a prerequisite for moral 
action. Quaker plaining brings communal moral concerns into the realm 
of the aesthetic. These concerns were made concrete, as it were, in the 
meeting where I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in the early 1990s. 
Participants supported the development of a 'wild garden', introduced 
low energy 'green' lighting, redesigned the building to improve disabled 
access, enforced a no-smoking and no-drinking rule on the premises, 
and so on. Discussions surrounding these improvements (for this is how 
the changes were perceived) were both moral and aesthetic-in the 
traditional sense of these terms-relating simultaneously to the good and 
the beautiful. 
But if plaining is moral it is also expressive. Like Kant, Croce (1995) 
argues that we know the world through the representations of it that we 
ourselves create. He goes one step further, however, in proposing that 
these representations are also expressions. For Croce, art as expression is 
at the root of the way we make sense of the world. Expression is neither 
rule-governed nor reducible to recipes; expression, for the artist, is a 
result of successfully achieving what he or she set out to achieve. 
Expression is a form of self-understanding in which an individual is able 
to say 'that's how I feel' or even 'that's how I am'. It is a matter of 
seeing the world from the standpoint of the work which, in this context, 
might for example be a meeting house, the act of worship or a peace 
vigil. The work provides a way of seeing. Meeting for worship is a 
metonym of the world and, furthermore, it recreates and expresses a 
world characterized by the aesthetic and moral values represented by the 
Quaker tradition. I use the term 'tradition' because the aesthetic work 
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cannot only be judged through the intentions of its authors: the repre­
sentation (of worship) is not erased or materially changed if one person 
is sitting as though merely waiting for the bus. 
Can we say that Quaker plaining is similarly a life made aesthetic, a 
means of expressing just what Friends ought and need to say? This is 
indeed what we are often given to believe to be the object of 
Quakerism. Works that we consider outstanding, in the sense of being 
perfect or beautiful, are not merely exemplary in their deployment of 
the techniques of art (or craft, or 'right assembling') but are also works 
standing for the attitudes to which Quakers give assent, that is, all that 
justifies the plain. If we were only interested in the external features, the 
superficial covering of the work, then we might exclude consideration 
of the rightness and/ or wrongness of the views it articulates. However, 
we are interested in far more than that, we are interested in the inten­
tions of those who produced it, intentions which Friends take to have a 
moral (and probably spiritual) foundation. Meeting houses are an impor­
tant example of such works, along with the Book of Discipline and form 
of worship: they are exemplars, expressions of a way of seeing the world 
and also of living in it, with which all Quakers are familiar and which 
prompt them to perceive and act in the world in a particular way. Like 
aesthetics, plaining is a complex, polysemic term, which describes one 
strand of a complex discourse which has remained important in the 
West at least since the days of early Greek philosophy. Throughout his­
tory, the plain makes sense only in relation to its opposite-the grand or 
embellished. In what follows I shall explore the broader historical trajec­
tory of this discourse in order to avoid a limiting parochialism, to 
understand better the way it is manifested specifically among Quakers, 
and in order to help us judge the relevance of the discourse today. 
Plain/ Grand Discourse in Historical Perspective 
The plain was extant as an influential discourse long before George Fox 
and his contemporaries adopted it in the mid-seventeenth century. 
Focusing particularly on language, Peter Auksi (1995) shows that the 
oppositional discourse of the plain and grand styles has its roots deep in 
the Classical tradition of rhetoric. The plaining of Quakers is a part of 
this larger, more complex discourse, involving an unending tension 
between plaining and, for want of a better word, embellishment. By 
thus contextualizing the Quaker plain style I believe that we can better 
appreciate its pervasive ambiguity, paradox and contradiction, as well as 
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its potential as ethically informed critical aesthetic. For instance, being 
simple is no simple matter. Even in the seventeenth century Friends 
complained that simplicity had become affectation. It is worth briefly 
reconsidering Margaret Fell/Fox's trenchant views on the matter: 
We are now coming into that which Christ cried woe against, minding 
altogether outward things, neglecting the inward work of Almighty God 
in our hearts. . . (Quaker Faith and Practice 199 5: 20.31, extracted from 
Portfolio 25/66, Library of the Society of Friends, London) 
Here, Fell/Fox is not so much criticizing Friends for choosing to live 
plainly as chastising them for adopting the plain style merely as an orna­
mentation. Far from helping Friends to see the essence of things unclut­
tered by external embellishment, some Friends had, in their enthusiasm 
for exclusivity, overstepped the mark. As Auksi points out during his 
discussion of Pauline simplicity: 
If the devotee of Christian plainness in artistic expression has one central 
premise, it is this: the more lowly, artless, ineloquent, unadorned, and 
'earthen' the outward vessel or covering garment of its style is, the more 
God-given and divinely persuasive appears the excellency of the matter to 
be conveyed or covered (Auski 1995: 91). 
Fell/Fox is reminding Friends how misguided this assumption is. To pay 
too much attention to the form or style, the 'outward covering' is to 
turn attention away from what is truly important-content, the kernel, 
the seed. However, to cultivate the artless is to be artful, and that is to 
deny the Light Within. In any case, Fell/Fox's opinion went largely 
unheeded at the time and the rules and regulations, glossed as 'disci­
pline', accumulated throughout most of the eighteenth century (see 
Vann 1969). It is worthwhile to consider in more detail the discourse of 
which this is just one example. 
In the first place, plain is to grand as spirit is to flesh and it is on this 
correspondence that the moral purchase of the plain rests. According to 
the Apostle Paul and many others, the plain generally emphasizes the 
internal over the external, content over form: the latter taken as super­
ficial and inherently of lesser worth (Auksi 1995: Ch. 4 passim). Paul 
attempted to distance the new religious awareness from the old, separat­
ing the dry ritualism of the old guard from the freedom and intensity 
that come from the promptings of the inward spirit. He spoke with the 
assistance not of men but of God: his rhetorical ideals are moral ideals 
which agree perfectly with the Sermon on the Mount. The Scriptural 
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distinction between the kernel and the husk, between that which comes 
from God and that which men and women invest to give the kernel a 
fleshly, rhetorical ornamentation, became a key metaphor in the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries. There are numerous references to 
Paul's epistles in the writings of early Friends and particularly in Fox 
(Pickvance 1989). Throughout the ages, the plain has been made to 
stand for the spiritual, the otherworldly, whereas its opposite, the grand, 
has implied 'urbanity and elegance' or more basically the material world 
(Auksi 1995: 40). But insofar as the plain may encase and therefore 
obscure, rather than reveal the Spirit, the claim to moral superiority by 
the plain must remain a site of contestation. 
The plain is open to aesthetic judgment and is therefore subjective. 
Like the grand, the plain can be thought of as elegant, fashionable and 
therefore fleeting. A contemporary example is the trend towards rnini­
malism which characterizes interior design, as well as some modern 
painting and music. Plato, in his Republic, concludes 'beauty of style and 
harmony and grace and good rhythm depend on simplicity' (quoted in 
Anksi 1995: 44)-establishing that the plain is an aesthetic ideal to 
which all the liberal arts ought to conform. Cicero was fully aware of 
the importance of the 'careful negligence' (1995: 56) resulting from a lack 
of ornament. He compares the plain style to the cosmetic adornment of 
women who can please even when unembellished. On the other hand, 
the plain has on occasion been characterized as crude, ugly and less than 
pleasing. While Jerome cautions that clothes may be overadorned he 
adds, 'an affected shabbiness does not become a Christian' (1995: 152). 
But then Jerome also admits that in his own translations of Scripture, 
'the art was to hide the art' (1995: 168). There is nothing that is 
essentially plain, then. 
The plain is an effect, a construct, no matter how strong or sincere 
one's convictions. Among some eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Friends it led to quaintness. Classical rhetoricians such as Demosthenes 
manifest a major paradox: they praise simplicity, but as an effect, as an 
explicitly constructed artefact. It was this paradox that Fell/Fox sought 
to expose. We might argue that plaining becomes authentic only when 
it is utterly habitual or 'second nature'. But whether authentic or not, 
the plain can be well or poorly constructed, that is, it has aesthetic 
qualities. Quintillian fiercely criticizes the extreme use of common 
vulgarisms in the name of a sincere and unostentatious simplicity 
because they miss the crucial point that 'naturalism' is itself an artistic 
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construct (Auksi 1995: 40). For Symon Patrick, the seventeenth-century 
pamphleteer, the plain style is a human achievement for those who have 
submitted to reason, humane learning and civilised order rather than an 
inspired gift, presented to the chosen few (1995: 277-78). Apart from 
Quaker texts, seventeenth-century handbooks of homiletics broaden the 
ideal of rhetorical plainness including advice on right living, liturgy, 
manners, dress and so on (1995: 290). The preacher is pressed to conceal 
his art and artifice and any mode of artistic expression, plain or not, as 
representing a formal technical skill. Of course, in concealing his �rt he 
reaffirms it. The plain is rarely artless, it is generally a construct10n, a 
more or less conscious means of eschewing embellishment. 
A further important theme within plain/ grand discourse is that truth 
needs no ornamentation. The following derives from London Yearly 
Meeting of 1691: 
It is our tender and Christian advice that Friends take care to keep to 
truth and plainness, in language, habit, deportment and behaviour; that 
the simplicity of truth in these things may not wear out nor be lost in our 
days, nor in our posterity's; and to avoid pride and immodesty in apparel, 
and all vain superfluous fashions of the world (Quaker Faith and Practice 
1995: 20.28). 
The truth is plain, the corollary being that embellishment leads to falsity. 
Plato complains that the grand style can confuse, obscure or manipulate 
the truth. But then Gorgias, the Socratic dialogue attributed to Plato, is 
full of subtle rhetorical devices (Auksi 1995: 43). Demetrius argues that 
ornateness slaps of insincerity, agreeing with Aeschylus, 'Simple are the 
words of truth' (1995: 46-49). The Desert Fathers contributed substan­
tially to this position. Basil, for instance, consistently noted the limitation 
of Classical art and rhetoric (1995: 157-58). Quakers pursue the same 
claim regarding the liturgy. They stripped bare the Anglican ritual in 
order that the Truth (Christ, the Spirit) might be known directly 
(Barclay 1841: 9). 
Among those who might be taken as the immediate forebears of 
Quakerism, Calvin is scathing of pagan orators and of embellishment in 
religion more generally, and is stridently critical of the Catholic Church 
for that reason (Auksi 1995: 216-28). Zwinglian liturgy goes still further, 
denying the world and its art altogether. What remains of Zwingli's 
starkly reduced and bare mode of worship is the word. To try and 
represent God is to misrepresent God's very nature-so it is not the 
product but the intention that is wrong. Spirit is ineffable and cannot be 
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properly known by words, images and materials that misrepresent its 
very nature. Taken to its logical extreme, the spiritualist argument 
would imply the final inadequacy of all words before God. In driving 
towards stillness, silence and the plain, Zwingli helped make possible 
many other experiments in negation and abstraction-including 
Quakerism. He believes that God cannot be represented but the paradox 
is that the absence of representation itself is made to represent God 
(Auksi 1995: 228-31). 
Both plain and grand styles derive primarily from the agent, not the 
act: they each result from the author's disposition. Aristotle, while agree­
ing that rhetoric is an important art, argues that it is the moral character 
of the orator which is essential to his ability to persuade. This is a 
distinction later upheld by Augustine who holds that the life of the 
speaker has greater weight in determining whether he is obediently 
heard than any grandness of eloquence. The mediaeval theologian Peter 
Damian wrote: 'A clear life is of more value as an example than elo­
quence or precise elegance in words'. His model is John: 'Let the sim­
plicity of Christ instruct me'. The plain is a way of life, not just a manner 
of speaking (Auksi 1995: 189). As Fell/Fox noted, it is not sufficient 
merely to change one's clothes, one needs to change one's life. The 
plain is held up as a religious ideal, as one that individuals might aspire to. 
The plain style serves as a metonym for the person. Among the most 
ardent champions of the plain style were the Stoics, who maintained a 
rational, one might say 'puritan', plainness in speech, dress and lifestyle, 
scorning arts such as cooking, painting, sculpture, architecture. For the 
Stoics, pleasure was a vice. The leading Stoic, Seneca, regarded style as a 
moral index, as an ethical reflector of character and society. His central 
premise was that an individual's soul or spirit shapes their abilities: a 
person's speech just like their life. He argued that while metaphor has its 
place, speech which deals with the truth should be unadorned-an 
argument developed by several Renaissance Christian humanists (Auksi 
1995: 36). Cicero quipped that the Stoics would teach us all to fall 
silent: Stoicism ad absurdum or Quaker worship? (1995: 64). 
As a result of this slight detour it is possible to see that the plain/ 
grand, as discourse, has a long and complex history. The plain has, for 
more than 2000 years, been locked into a dialogue with the grand. It has 
remained a site of profound aesthetic, spiritual and moral contestation. 
No sphere of society has escaped-economics, the arts, religion, leisure, 
politics-in all of these spheres, the discourse of the plain has been, 
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above all, a critical endeavour. This is largely because the grand has 
generally remained in the ascendancy, has garnered for itself greater 
resources and has remained the more powerful ideology. The plain has 
most often been invoked in order to 'curb the excesses' of the 
influential, the dominant, the powerful. The plain has remained, for the 
most part, a levelling tendency-marking distinction without hierarchy. 
With this in mind, I return to the question posed at the start of this 
essay: What relevance, if any, does Quaker plaining have today? 
The Aestheticization of Late Capitalism 
and Quaker Plaining as Social Critique 
While a great deal has been written about the characteristics of late 
capitalism one feature is often taken as central: the related growth of 
commodification and consumption (Baudrillard 1998; Bocock 1993; 
Cross 199 3; Featherstone 1991; Lash and U rry 1994; Slater 1997). We 
hear, often enough, that we live in a consumer society, but what does 
that mean? Bauman argues that nowadays it is consumption or consumer 
behaviour rather than work or production that is 'the cognitive and 
moral focus of life, integrative bond of the society, and the focus of 
systematic management' (Bauman 1989: 46, quoted in Smart 1993: 64). 
According to Smart, the pursuit of pleasure through the consumption of 
commodities and services is the norm, replacing the modernist tendency 
to self-denial. 'A corollary of which is that complex and subtle forms of 
seduction have assumed increasing significance in processes of systemic 
reproduction and social reproduction' (Smart 1993: 64). The argument 
that aesthetics refers to more than merely 'the art object' has already 
been considered and I return to this issue here, approaching from a 
slightly different direction. 
A corollary of the growth of consumerism is the aestheticization of 
everyday life. Featherstone identifies three aspects: the first relates to art 
movements, such as Dada, which erase the line between art and every­
day life. The second involves the tendency among some bourgeois 
groups and individuals to transform their own lives into works of art, 
transfused, that is, with the aesthetic attitude-the Bloomsbury Group, 
Oscar Wilde, Balzac and Baudelaire, twentieth-century philosophers 
such as G.E. Moore, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, and so forth. 
Third, we are confronted at every turn by 'the rapid flow of signs and 
images' which pervade our day-to-day lives, issuing forth from shop 
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windows and street corner hoardings, newspapers, magazines, the tele­
vision and computer screen, junk mail and the wrappings of commodi­
ties which companies try harder and harder to make distinctive 
(Featherstone 1991: 66-68 [67]). Our attention is increasingly drawn to 
the surface of things, to the packaging of commodities, to the elaborate 
though often very subtle coding which enables one manufacturer to 
differentiate their product from the next. The process, commodity 
fetishism, involves the eclipse of use-value by exchange-value and was 
noted by Marx in Capital. It obscures and may hide altogether a variety 
of important human relationships, between the consumer and those 
involved in the productive process, for example. 
In relation to this overwhelming trend, then, the Quaker plain style 
represents a significant alternative. Quakers, having emphasized the plain 
for more than three centuries, have the cultural resources to free them­
selves and possibly others from the current hegemony of 'consumer 
culture'. Even to make a preliminary first step by making ourselves and 
others more aware of the situation and its dangers would be worthwhile. 
Perhaps the availability of such an alternative has never been more 
important than it is today. For Baudrillard, 'Consumer culture is effec­
tively a postmodern culture, a depthless culture in which all values have 
become transvalued and art triumphed over reality' (quoted in Feather­
stone 1991: 85). The plain style, as noted above, emphasizes spirit over 
and above 'flesh' (the material world). It might be argued that the plain 
is well positioned to bring to mind a reality over and above that 
suggested by commodification and consumerism. Although there is no 
space here to discuss the ways in which Quakers might be led further to 
consider their testimony to the plain, we should at least note its impor­
tance as a pedagogical strategy. Early Friends were at pains to ensure that 
the justification and purpose of the plain life was made clear to adepts, 
newcomers and their children alike (for examples from the Advices and 
Queries, Quaker Faith and Practice 1995: paras. 101-102, see Stagg 1961). 
The German philosopher Wolfgang Welsch, like Featherstone, per­
ceives a growing tendency towards the aestheticization of everyday life 
but discovers in the process something more profound. Welsch notes 
that the increasingly intense commodification of the world has generated 
a tremendous upsurge in aesthetics and in so doing has identified per­
haps the latest, and in some ways most fundamental, manifestation of the 
plain/ grand struggle. Reality itself is coming to count increasingly as an 
aesthetic construction (Welsch 1997: 85). 
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Aestheticization, according to Welsch, describes a process operating at 
two significant levels. The most superficial is a surface aestheticization­
the application of an aesthetic patina to reality (for example public places 
such as shopping malls and railway stations) and to products: take the 
marketing of cigarettes, confectionery and automobiles as three obvious 
examples. This is not just a matter of extending aesthetics beyond art; 
daily life is being painted over, artfully, with art. The most superficial 
aesthetic values dominate: desire, amusement, enjoyment; each empha­
sizing the dressing up or 'cosmetics of reality' (Welsch 1997: 3). Once 
again, then, the embellishment generated by the grand has come into 
the ascendancy. This is the stimulation of aesthetics as an entirely eco­
nomic strategy, representing the triumph of form over function. 
Furthermore, aesthetics is no longer merely the vehicle but the essence. 
Training shoes, not necessarily purchased in order to take part in sports, 
provide an example of aestheticization as a means of achieving an almost 
frenzied degree of product differentiation (1997: 2-4). This level 
coincides more or less with the three aspects identified by Featherstone 
considered above. 
Welsch further identifies a less explicit process, 'deep-seated aestheti­
cization'. Aesthetics is now not merely central to the product but to 
production itself; it is central to the design process. Reality is increas­
ingly constituted through media, for example computer and video 
games-virtual reality (Welsch 1997: 4-7). If surface-level aestheticiza­
tion governs our perception of separate bits of reality, deep-seated 
aestheticization determines the manner of reality's being and our con­
ception of it. Welsch underlines the extent to which aesthetic judgments 
are being applied during all stages of the production process itself, pri­
marily through computer-aided design. The current aestheticization 
attains its consummation in individuals and particularly to individual 
bodies, but also in our relations with others. The body has become an 
increasingly important site for aestheticization in relation to dressing, 
modification and so forth, though this is a complex phenomenon (see 
also Featherstone 1982). 
Insofar as everything is not made uniformly better in the aestheticiza­
tion process, how can we judge good from bad? We would generally 
look to judge according to criteria of morality, truth or aesthetics. Ethics 
has itself become increasingly bound up with aesthetics; our discussion 
of plain/ grand discourse suggests that this was always the case. The 
criterion of truth has been diminished as scientific rationality itself has 
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increasingly become an aesthetic category (Welsch 1997: 20-24). The 
process of epistemological aestheticization has been under way for more 
than two centuries. Komer points out that 'It is a fundamental axiom of 
the Kantian philosophy that our thinking depends for its objects on per­
ception' (Komer 1990: 45). In his Critique if Pure Reason, Kant argued 
that we impose a sense of order on the world and come to know the 
world, a priori, by categorizing it in terms of time and space. It is 
through this process that things in the world exist for us in the first 
place: reality extends just so far as do these facilities. This is an intrinsi­
cally aesthetic adventure insofar as these categories exist as forms of 
intuition and imagination and is fundamental to our knowledge of the 
world (see also Collinson 1992: 134-44). Reality is a mutable construct 
which human beings generate through forms of intuition, projections, 
illusions, fantasies, and on, and such knowledge implies an aesthetic per­
spective (Welsch 1997: 46-4 7). 
According to Welsch, then, there has been an immensely significant 
'aesthetic tum' during the last 250 years. The Enlightenment reality can 
no longer be seen as independent of cognition, but only as the result of a 
process of social construction-and this is equally true of science and 
hermeneutics (Welsch 1997: 22-23). If in the past we thought of 
aesthetics as concerned only with secondary, supplementary 'outward' 
realities, then today we must recognize that aesthetics (or 'proto­
aesthetics') is intimately, even inseparably, bound up with knowledge 
and reality: this is correctly identified by Welsch as a major legacy of 
modernity. I would add that, together, these deep-rooted processes 
represent an important contemporary manifestation of embellishment, of 
'grand' discourse. 
Welsch suggests that there is no single rational argument which is able 
to engage effectively with this aestheticization. All thinkable objections 
will themselves be subject to it, insofar as our view of the world has 
become thoroughly aestheticized. This epistemological or transcendental 
aestheticization is the driving force behind the more manifest processes. 
In assuming this manner of constructing reality we become aesthetic to 
our core and it is this cognitive preparation that facilitates our everyday 
participation in the mundane processes of 'surface' and 'deep-seated' aes­
theticization. And if aestheticization means that the unaesthetic is made, 
or understood, to be aesthetic, how can we critique artefacts of the 
aestheticization process, given the unavailability of ethics and reason for 
this purpose? Having discounted the criteria of truth and morality, we 
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are left with aesthetic criteria which, Welsch claims, do enable us to 
distinguish between the accomplished and the unaccomplished, better or 
worse, exemplary and digressive (1997: 24-25). It would certainly seem 
appropriate to emphasize aesthetic criteria in this age of global 
aestheticization. 
Maquet compares the aesthetic point of view with contemplation 
(Maquet 1986: 51-58). Similarly Welsch argues that aesthetics teaches us 
that we need respite from the bombardment to which modern culture 
subjects our senses-we require 'delays, quiet areas and interruption'. 
Total aestheticization inevitably generates its antithesis: where every­
thing is presented as beautiful nothing is beautiful. What is more, 
continued stimulation leads to torpor and a sense of powerlessness, or 
'anaestheticization', along with a growing inability to discriminate 
between the good, the bad and the ugly (Welsch 1997: 83). Aesthetics 
alone facilitates a calm assessment of the jumble that aestheticization 
produces. Critical progress within the context of gross commodification 
currently depends not upon an exaggerated or 'hyper-aestheticization' of 
culture but, instead, the development of a 'blind spot culture'. To per­
ceive something is necessarily to overlook something else: vision is 
impossible without a blind-spot. Developed sensibility, an example of 
which is plaining, is attentive to this and faces the consequences, not 
only in relation to form and design, traditionally defined, but also in 
daily life. An aesthetically reflective awareness helps illuminate and 
clarifY issues which arise in our daily lives and marks the impact of dif­
ference and exclusion. Welsch makes great claims for an 'aestheticically 
sensitised awareness' which he argues is allergic to injustice and encour­
ages us to defend the rights of the oppressed. As such, aesthetics is able 
to contribute at least indirectly to the micro-politics that infuse our 
worldview. If we shrink from merely sanctioning every aspect of the 
aestheticization process then it is from the standpoint of aesthetics that 
critique must come (Welsch 1997: 25-27). 
And so it is possible to see why plaining conceived as aesthetic is so 
important. It is as morally and spiritually informed aesthetic that the 
Quaker plain can enable us to become conscious of and therefore 
critique an ideology that finds its apogee in the prevailing consumer 
culture. While the Quaker plain style provides an antidote to the surface 
aestheticization of everyday life, plaining represents an alternative to the 




One's manner of living can be many things, including an aesthetic, as 
Tolstoy (1969) and, most recently, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze 
have commented (Goodchild 1996). Plaining, a more or less self-con­
scious process which has constituted an ethic as well as an aesthetic, has 
been at the core of a Quaker way of life since the mid-seventeenth cen­
tury. The testimonies are most obviously constitutive of a moral code; 
even the apparently trivial prescriptions and proscriptions (the 
'peculiarities') were undergirded by Scriptural (and therefore, moral) 
authority. How this was to be done, unless by example, is less clear. It is 
possible that Quaker plaining, as an ethically, spiritually and politically 
inspired aesthetic, could prove a valuable asset in helping us see and 
consequently see through the damaging aestheticization processes 
identified by Welsch, Featherstone and others. And it is the continuing 
relevance and potentially liberating force of the plain and plaining, a 
dynamic and critical aesthetic, morally and theologically informed, that I 
have sought to highlight in this essay. 
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